Commercial Litigation Update

As the end of the term approaches, the Court is increasingly divided in its decisions. However, the composition of the majorities is not often the 6-3 conservative/liberal division stereotype that many observers, critics, and media expect. As several key decisions show today, the Chief Justice has taken up the center ground and, as I've suggested before, often has the ability to bring Justice Kavanaugh with him, as they, to paraphrase the country singer Maren Morris, meet in the middle.

Of the four cases decided today, the one that likely pertains to the largest number of this blog’s readers is Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, who wrote for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Interestingly, Justice Thomas largely joined Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion.

With four decisions today, the Court has now cut its backlog down to the mid-teens. And with decisions likely tomorrow as well, the Court is well on its way to clearing the docket as the term ends.

The question of whether a would-be trademark, “TRUMP TOO SMALL,” warrants a First Amendment exception to the Lanham Act’s prohibition on registering a living person’s name as a trademark without that person’s permission has now reached the United States Supreme Court. On June 5, 2023, in Vidal v. Elster, Case 22-704, the high court granted the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (hereinafter, the “Government”) petition for certiorari to determine whether, under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c), the refusal to register a trademark containing another person’s name violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when that mark implies criticism of a government official or public figure. As we wrote last year, one cannot normally trademark another person’s name, but in the case of Steve Elster’s trademark application for TRUMP TOO SMALL, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “CAFC”) held in In re Elster, 26 F.4th 1328, 2022 USPQ2d 195 (Fed. Cir. 2022), that one’s First Amendment right to make social commentary about a public figure trumps (bad pun intended) the Lanham Act. Whether the Supreme Court agrees with the CAFC soon will be determined.

It should come as no surprise to constitutionalists, practitioners under the Federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§3729–3733) (FCA), and auditors of the oral argument in the case that the Supreme Court has held that the federal government may move to dismiss an FCA action under §3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on. United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc. To assert this right, the government must actually intervene (which is not difficult since the statute allows it at any time before final judgment, even on appeal), and the propriety of dismissal is to be adjudicated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation, and dismissal should be granted in all but the most extraordinary cases. 

Indian tribal rights led the Supreme Court’s docket today. In one case, the Court held that the federal Bankruptcy Code abrogated the sovereign immunity of tribal governments. And in another, this time upholding tribal rights, the Court held upheld the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), with its arguably discriminatory provision requiring the placement of foster or adoptive Indian children with Indian caretakers. Justice Gorsuch, perhaps the Court’s most interested and knowledgeable member concerning tribal rights and interests, was the lone dissenter in the bankruptcy case and provided a unique historical perspective in a scholarly concurrence in the ICWA case. Finally, a unanimous Court held that the Constitution allows the retrial of a defendant who had been tried in an improper venue before jurors drawn from the wrong district. Three interesting and detailed opinions, none reflecting any major division in the Court, though perhaps Justices Thomas and Alito might seem to live on an island of their own.

In our first post we discussed what a trademark is and how business owners can strengthen the protection of their trademarks. But, obtaining a trademark registration is just the first step—you also need to monitor your trademark to make sure no one else is using it, or a confusingly similar trademark, without your permission. Trademark infringement occurs when another business or individual uses your trademark, or a similar mark, in a way that is likely to confuse or deceive consumers about the source of the goods or services. This can be detrimental to your business by both diluting your brand and causing you to lose customers. This post explores some of the best methods business owners can employ to monitor their trademarks.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in Slattery v. Hochul, reversing the dismissal of a First Amendment challenge to New York Labor Law §203-e (also referred to as the “Boss Bill”). The Boss Bill prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees based upon their reproductive health decisions, including “a decision to use or access a particular drug, device or medical service,” and also forbids employers from “accessing an employee’s personal information regarding the employee’s . . . reproductive health decision making.” The term “reproductive health decision making” necessarily would include an employee’s decision to have an abortion or use contraception. The Boss Bill, unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, does not contain an exemption for religiously affiliated organizations.

Emerging from the pattern of unanimity, or near unanimity, that has characterized most of the cases decided so far this term, the Supreme Court decided one of its most eagerly awaited and controversial cases. And the outcome of the case will confound the predictions of many voting-rights analysts and critics of the Court and its Chief Justice.

The case is Allen v. Milligan, and, in a 5-4 opinion written by the Chief Justice, and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, and, most significantly, by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that a districting plan adopted by the State of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. I think it is fair to say that, following the oral argument of the case, most liberal commentators expected significant further erosion of Section 2, and most politically, if not jurisprudentially, conservative observers were licking their lips. Each side has been surprised.

The New York State Court Rule (the “Rule”), 22 NYCRR 202.20-d, that governs entity depositions is intended to streamline the method for examining entities. Although it is similar to FRCP 30(b)(6), it is not entirely the same. The differences between the Rule and FRCP 30(b)(6), as well as the fact that there is minimal case law interpreting the Rule, will likely lead to some confusion for commercial entities - and their general counsel - that receive a notice or subpoena to testify at a deposition for a case pending in New York State court. This blog post provides a brief overview of what is required by such a notice or subpoena and the related rights that are afforded to the commercial entity.