Commercial Litigation Update

In a major win for healthcare providers, on September 20th a Louisiana state court jury awarded $421 million in favor of an out-of-network provider in its long dispute with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana (“BCBS of Louisiana”). BCBS of Louisiana is the largest insurer in the State of Louisiana.

Payors have developed a reputation for underpaying or denying payment to providers altogether. This is especially true for providers who do not have contracts with insurance companies and, as a result, are out-of-network. Meanwhile providers who have contracts with  insurance companies, i.e., in-network providers, are subject to preferential contract rates and in exchange are supposed to be paid in a timely manner. However, many providers have learned this is not what happens. Out-of-network providers, in particular, face an uphill battle to get reimbursed for the medically necessary services rendered to patients. The out-of-network provider in this case experienced just that.

Since there is no contract between the provider and payor in an out-of-network context, the provider submits its billed charges to the payor. Many states have balance billing laws that preclude the provider from seeking payment from the insured directly. Knowing that the provider has limited recourse, insurance companies will often either not pay or pay slowly. St. Charles Surgical Hospital and Center for Restorative Breast Surgery (“St. Charles”) is well-known for its treatment of cancer patients. After not being appropriately reimbursed for the services rendered to patients, St. Charles filed its lawsuit in Louisiana state court in 2017. According to St. Charles, BCBS of Louisiana would authorize surgeries, the providers would perform those surgeries pursuant to the authorizations, and then the insurer would not render the appropriate payment. The case involved about 7,000 procedures that were performed on an out-of-network basis. St. Charles claimed that BCBS of Louisiana only paid approximately 9% of the total amount billed for these services. St. Charles’s claims against the insurance company were for fraud and abuse of rights. The insurance company’s defense included arguments that authorizing medical treatment did not guarantee payment at those rates. Rather, BCBS of Louisiana negotiated individual deals for out-of-network reimbursement with brokers or employers.

The last two years have provided legal professionals with a crash course in the remote practice of law. Attorneys and judges have been forced to navigate COVID-19 protocols and adapt to the rapidly changing legal landscape in the digital age. While the pandemic created an abundance of new technological challenges, it also impacted one of the oldest standards in our judicial system—service of process.

Last month, former attorney Michael Avenatti was sentenced to four years in prison for stealing about $300,000 from his client, Stormy Daniels. But Mr. Avenatti was already serving a thirty-month prison sentence for attempting to extort a “settlement” from Nike.

Breathless headlines warn of the “Great Resignation” or a “Resignation Apocalypse” that will soon empty cubicles all around the nation. Exaggerated as these reports may be, there is a kernel of truth to these warnings, and they should impact the way lawyers and their clients view depositions.

For decades, the median number of years that a salaried employee stayed with a single employer remained relatively stable at about four years. But this number is expected to decline in the years ahead.

On January 12, 2022, the closely watched Nevada lawsuit filed by emergency medicine providers against one of the largest health insurance companies in the world—UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company—was again the focus of hundreds of thousands of providers throughout the country.

The recent hearing followed a seven-week trial during which the jury found that United and its affiliates deliberately underpaid frontline healthcare workers for emergency medical services. The jury awarded $60 million in punitive damages and $2.65 million in compensatory damages to three Nevada-based emergency physician group affiliates of TeamHealth, a physician services and staffing company.

On September 30, 2021, the federal Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services issued “Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part II,” the second in a series of interim final regulations (the “Second NSA Rules”) implementing the No Surprises Act (“NSA”). This new federal law became effective for services on or after January 1, 2022.

We recently participated in what the New Jersey Law Journal called the “first complex civil jury trial to be conducted in person since the COVID-19 pandemic.” Although the case settled shortly after opening statements, this experience taught us that New Jersey courts are ready to try complex civil cases safely and responsibly with new COVID protocols that may force trial attorneys to depart from their usual practices. We published an article in the New Jersey Law Journal about this experience that may be of interest to our readers.

Imagine this: You litigate a case for years. Your opponent wins summary judgment. You appeal. The appellate court agrees that the summary judgment was erroneous and remands for trial. On remand, your opponent argues that the appellate court actually affirmed the dismissal of one the claims that was clearly remanded for trial. The lower court accepts that argument. What do you do?

You are facing the injustice of being denied the victory you just won in the appellate court. You know you can return to the appellate court again—someday—as of right. But if that return trip does not happen ...

Congratulations—you’ve been sued again. This time it’s in federal court under the Lanham Act. You review the complaint, and while it’s not outrageously frivolous on its face (which we previously discussed here), it’s also not your run-of-the-mill Lanham Act case. You might assume that your only option is to fully litigate the claim, and wait for vindication from the Court on summary judgment or after trial. But the Lanham Act provides another remedy: fee-shifting to recoup your legal fees. If the Lanham Act claim you’ve defended against is “exceptional” under the ...

Congratulations. You’ve been sued in court in New Jersey. To make matters worse, the complaint is full of lies. Not distorted versions of the truth or someone’s interpretation of events that actually occurred, but outright false statements of fact. The kind that make you look bad in your personal and business communities. The kind that hurt your reputation and cause people to think twice about doing business with you or your company.

You are understandably upset and want to go on the offensive, but your lawyer tells you the playbook is empty. She explains that there is an “absolute ...

The Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously held in Linda Cowley v. Virtua Health System (A-47-18) (081891) that the “common knowledge” exception of the Affidavit of Merit Statute applies only when a simple negligence standard is at issue, and does not apply when a specific standard of care must be evaluated.  In this case involving if and how to reinsert a removed nasogastric tube, the Court reversed the judgement of the Appellate Division and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because she failed to submit an affidavit of merit within the time required by the Affidavit of Merit Statute.

Enacted in 1995, the Affidavit of Merit Statute requires that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases “provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The statute’s primary purpose “to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily [can] be identified at an early stage of litigation.” Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998). Failure to provide an affidavit or its legal equivalent is “deemed a failure to state a cause of action,” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29, requiring dismissal with prejudice.

An exception to this rule is the judicially-created “common knowledge” exception which provides that an expert is not needed to demonstrate that a defendant professional breached some duty of care “where the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence.” Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985). In those exceptional circumstances, the “jurors’ common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine a defendant’s negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts.” Hubbard v.  Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 394 (2001). Thus, a plaintiff in a malpractice case is exempt, under the common knowledge exception, from compliance with the affidavit of merit requirement where it is apparent that “the issue of negligence is not related to technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of [the licensed] practitioner[].” Sanzari v.  Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961).

On March 23, 2020, Governor Phil Murphy signed Executive Order 109, which “limit[ed] non-essential adult elective surgery and invasive procedures, whether medical or dental, [in order to] assist in the management of vital healthcare resources during this public health emergency.” The purpose of EO 109 was to “limit[] exposure of healthcare providers, patients, and staff to COVID-19 and conserve[] critical resources such as ventilators, respirators, anesthesia machines, and Personal Protective Equipment (‘PPE’) [that] are essential to combatting the spread of the virus.” At the time EO 109 was executed, coronavirus cases were rapidly increasing within the State. On March 23rd, New Jersey had 2,844 coronavirus cases in all 21 counties, an increase of 935 over the previous day, and at least 27 people had died.

In the weeks that followed, New Jersey saw the surge in cases for which it was preparing. On April 4, the three-day average of new confirmed positive COVID-19 cases peaked at 4,064 cases, and by April 14th, there were 8,084 of COVID-related hospitalizations and a staggering 1,705 patients on ventilators. But since that time, thanks to social distancing and New Jersey’s ability to flatten the curve, these numbers have fallen drastically. By May 11th, the three-day average of new, positive cases had fallen to 1,572 new cases—a 61 percent decrease. Likewise, the three-day average of new hospitalizations had fallen to 4,277 patients—a 48 percent decrease.

In light of this decreased burden on the healthcare system, Governor Murphy signed Executive Order 145, which allows for elective surgeries to resume as of 5 am on May 26, 2020. EO 145 provides that elective surgeries and invasive procedures may proceed at both licensed healthcare facilities and in outpatient settings not licensed by the Department of Health (e.g., health care professional offices, clinics, and urgent care centers), subject to limitations and precautions set forth in policies to be issued by the Division of Consumer Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Health, by Monday, May 18, 2020. EO 145 further states that the Department of Health and/or the Division of Consumer Affairs may issue supplemental or amended policies concerning elective surgeries and elective invasive procedures on or after Monday, May 18, 2020.

Consumer complaints regarding alleged price gouging have been increasing as the COVID-19 pandemic continues. Generally, price gouging occurs when there unreasonable increase the price of a consumer good (or service) during a public emergency. Although we are facing a national emergency, except for a March 23, 2020, executive order issued by President Trump prohibiting hoarding and price gouging of certain critical supplies, there is no federal price gouging law. Although there are proposal pending in Congress to more broadly prohibit price gouging, currently, the issue is ...

Imagine these scenarios:

• Your company cannot perform a contract because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
• A vendor informs you that she cannot provide your company with necessary goods because of supply chain issues caused by a governmental emergency declaration.
• A subcontractor cannot perform because its employees are self-quarantining.

These are not hypotheticals. Scenarios like these are playing out around the country. The real-world impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is colliding with contractual requirements, and there is new attention to the legal doctrines of “impossibility,” “frustration of purpose,” “impracticability, and “force majeure.”

What do they mean? In a nutshell, traditional contract law says that an unforeseeable event occurring after the contract was formed can excuse contract performance, and determining whether an event was unforeseeable will depend heavily on the specific facts and the language of the contract.

Across the nation, authorities are scrambling to meet the new challenges posed by COVID-19. The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has recommended that individuals remain six feet apart in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. On March 13, 2020, the White House proclaimed a national emergency and many State governments have ordered non-essential businesses to close, and residents to self-distance. However, these emergency measures conflict with the rules for personal service of process established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

Personal service of process is among the oldest and commonest means by which a court can obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. F.R.C.P. 4(e) provides that personal service of process can be accomplished by handing the process papers to the defendant personally or leaving the papers with a responsible person at the defendant’s dwelling.

In most cases, personal service involves the physical act of handing papers from one person to another. The very act of accomplishing personal service therefore violates the CDC’s recommendation that individuals remain six feet apart. However, it can also run contrary to more stringent restrictions imposed by State governments.

On Monday March 23, 2020, President Donald Trump signed an executive order aimed at preventing hoarding and price gouging.  Attorney General William H. Barr indicated that the order is authorized under the Defense Protection Act, which allows the United States to compel private industry to assist in meeting national defense needs in response to national emergencies.

The new executive order empowers the Health and Human Services Secretary to designate supplies as “critical.”  Hoarding – accumulating quantities beyond those reasonable to satisfy personal or business needs ...

As the coronavirus spreads throughout the country, hospitals and other health care providers are finding themselves inundated with patients. Those providers who are in-network with payors have and will likely continue to experience difficulty in complying with certain provisions of their contracts. For instance, as payors are also experiencing an unexpected influx of telephone traffic, the wait time for various approvals, including, but not limited to, pre-authorizations are being delayed.

Providers are often contractually obligated to obtain pre-authorizations for certain procedures and services prior to rendering the care. Due to the increased telephone traffic and increased wait times on the payor end, these providers are now faced with a dilemma. A process that as of two weeks ago only took a matter of ten to fifteen minutes now can take up to an hour or more. This creates a serious dilemma for those providers who need to render care to their patients and comply with their contractual obligations to payors.

The Senate has spoken to this issue via the Families First Act which prohibits cost sharing and imposing prior authorizations for COVID-19 related testing under Medicare, CHIP, and individual and small/large self-funded group plans. See Division F-Health Provisions, § 6001, Coverage of Testing for COVID-19. While some payors have recognized and acknowledged the difficulties posed by COVID-19 and have made exceptions to the standard requirements, those exceptions have been limited. For example, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association has indicated that its network of 36 BCBS companies will waive prior authorizations for diagnostic tests and covered services that are medically necessary for members diagnosed with COVID-19. Similarly, Wellmark and Anthem, Inc., have waived prior authorizations for covered services related to COVID-19. While these limited pre-authorization waivers are a start, they do not resolve the dilemma faced by those providers treating patients who are not suffering from COVID-19.

At the time of publication, at least twenty four states, plus Washington D.C. have declared states of emergency related to the novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”), with that number growing by the hour.  In addition to making more resources available to residents, in many cases, the declarations also trigger additional protections to consumers in the form of anti-price gouging laws. These laws, which automatically go into effect, are intended to prevent merchants from significantly increasing the cost of consumer goods and services during a crisis.

For instance, in New Jersey a ten ...