Commercial Litigation Update

As the snow has fallen on Washington, DC’s First Street over the past few days, the Supreme Court has begun to issue opinions in the current term.

One of those cases has been in the news constantly, as it relates to a matter at issue in the recent presidential campaign that will likely get attention after the inauguration. The other two relate to federal court jurisdiction, but they are also consequential because their fact patterns are likely to be duplicated in future litigation.

While, with the advent of the new administration, things very well might change, the news today that the Court has upheld a law that could ban the social media platform TikTok this Sunday is significant not only to expressive younger Americans (perhaps your children and mine) but also as a matter of national security.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has once again revived Sarah Palin’s longstanding defamation suit against The New York Times. The Second Circuit’s opinion highlights important procedural and substantive issues in defamation actions involving public figures, particularly in the current polarized media environment.

Palin’s lawsuit, which we previously wrote about here, relates to a 2017 Times editorial that incorrectly linked a political ad from the 2008 Republican vice presidential candidate and former governor of Alaska to a 2011 mass shooting in Arizona that killed six people and injured 13 more, including Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. After an initial dismissal that was reversed on appeal, Palin’s case proceeded to trial in February 2022.

During jury deliberations, the District Court Judge announced in open court that he believed Palin had failed to produce sufficient evidence of actual malice, and, for that reason, would grant judgment in favor of the Times. However, the judge allowed the jury to continue deliberations and the jury subsequently returned a verdict for the Times. The court later revealed in a public filing that members of the jury had learned about the judge’s decision to dismiss the case during deliberations after receiving push notifications on their smartphones. This unusual procedural sequence, compounded by errors during the trial, led the Second Circuit to vacate the judgment and order a retrial, which is scheduled to begin on April 14, 2025.

New episode of our video podcast, Speaking of Litigation: What makes a jury work—and what earns their trust?

Dive into the nuanced world of jury selection with Epstein Becker Green attorneys Eric Neiman, Teddy McCormick, and Jonathan Brollier.

This episode unpacks the art of voir dire, blending centuries-old practices with innovative tools such as artificial intelligence-driven analytics. Along the way, they tackle how to identify bias, manage polarization, and create a fair but effective jury pool in an era of societal change.

From high-stakes civil trials to the finer points of building rapport with jurors, discover how modern litigators balance strategy with ethics to shape the courtroom narrative. Whether you’re a seasoned litigator or just curious about the inside workings of jury trials, this discussion offers fresh perspectives and practical advice for excelling in the courtroom.

In its recent unpublished decision, United States ex rel. Stebbins v. Maraposa Surgical Inc., 2024 WL 4947274 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), the Third Circuit clarified that the public disclosure bar prevents whistleblower False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam actions arising from information gathered solely through publicly accessible databases.

As the Third Circuit explained, “[t]he FCA punishes the submission to the Government of fraudulent claims for payment under, for example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”  Id. at *1.  While the FCA encourages individuals, known as relators, to report government-related fraud by way of filing a qui tam suit, the public disclosure bar prevents a relator from bringing an FCA qui tam suit “if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed” in a “Federal report” or “from the news media” unless the relator is “an original source of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).  In the Third Circuit, “the public disclosure bar applies if either Z (fraud) or both X (misrepresented facts) and Y (true facts) are publicly disclosed by way of a listed source.” Stebbins, 2024 WL 4947274, at *2 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2013)). 

In United States ex rel. Stebbins v. Maraposa Surgical Inc. et al., despite having no affiliation whatsoever with the defendants, the relator filed a qui tam action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants fraudulently sought reimbursement for the arteriograms performed in a physician’s office, rather than a licensed ambulatory surgery center, which the relator asserted violates Pennsylvania’s regulations.  Without deciding whether the defendants actually engaged in any wrongdoing, the Third Circuit held that the public disclosure bar prohibited the relator from proceeding with suit because the relator drew each piece of information supporting his FCA allegations from publicly disclosed databases.

Background

On December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its decision in Stull v. Summa, a medical negligence case in which the defendants argued that Ohio’s statutory peer-review privilege protected from discovery the file a hospital maintained on a resident physician, which included, among other things, quality reviews and assessments of the resident’s clinical competency and professional conduct. The Supreme Court of Ohio decided one issue: Does the peer-review privilege in R.C. 2305.252 apply to a healthcare entity’s files concerning resident physicians?

This case arose from the medical treatment of head injuries that the patient sustained during a car crash. The patient and his guardians filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the hospital and its employed healthcare professionals, including a resident physician who participated in the patient’s care. The plaintiffs alleged that the resident improperly intubated the patient, causing the patient to sustain a brain injury

In its first decision on the merits in the current term, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court (per Jackson, J.) has held in Bouarfa v. Mayorkas that revocation of an approved visa petition under 8 U.S.C. §1155, based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security (the “Secretary”), is the kind of discretionary decision that falls within the purview of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.

The Court held that Section 1155 is a "quintessential grant of discretion." Thus, the Secretary “may” revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any time” for what the Secretary deems “good and sufficient cause.”

This broad grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary. This conclusion is similar to that reached as to other statutes held to “commi[t]” a decision “to agency discretion.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600. Following its recent line of decisions (here, unusually, unanimously), the Court takes a literal view of the text, holding that "Congress did not impose specific criteria or conditions limiting this authority, nor did it prescribe how or when the Secretary must act."

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Loper[1] decision, which overturned the longstanding precedent of the Chevron doctrine for agency deference, it was anticipated that lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court, would begin to decide whether specific deference to agency interpretation and power was appropriate, likely on a policy-by-policy and agency-by-agency basis. As expected, in the few short months since the Loper decision, the SEC and FINRA’s administrative power to seek and award civil penalties in their in-house disciplinary function has been called into question.

Specifically, alongside and in the same term as Loper, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. Jarksey, which reviewed whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties for securities fraud.  In Jarksey, the Supreme Court held that, “[w]hen the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.”

As the dietary supplement industry continues to draw attention from Congress, state attorneys general, and class action lawyers, now comes another state law trying to prohibit the sale of over-the-counter (“OTC”) dietary supplements that target weight loss and muscle building to minors – this time, in New Jersey.

On October 28, 2024, by a majority vote of 56 to 17, with four abstentions, the New Jersey General Assembly passed Assembly Bill No. 1848, which, if it goes into effect, will prohibit the sale or delivery of OTC diet pills, weight loss, and muscle building supplements to minors, unless the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian. Bill No 1848 is an exemplar of efforts intended to combat the misuse and abuse of these products and the potential causal relationship between these dietary supplements and eating disorders. Violators, including employees of retail establishments, may face a civil penalty of not more than $750.

The legislation sets forth that:

“no person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, limited liability company, or other entity shall sell, offer to sell, or offer for promotional purposes, either directly or indirectly by an agent or an employee, any over-the-counter diet pull or dietary supplement for weight loss or muscle building to a minor under 18 years of age, unless the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian.”

On October 30, 2024, in Alternative Global One, LLC v. Feingold, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed a trial court’s orders denying a New Jersey litigant’s motion to quash a subpoena for his deposition in underlying Florida litigation to which he was not a party. This decision illustrates that a litigant, even a non-party, must do more than assert blanket, unsubstantiated objections to a subpoena ad testificandum.

The appeal arose from a Florida litigation. In Alternative Global One, LLC v. Feingold, No. 2023-000688-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2023), plaintiffs Alternative Global Companies filed suit against defendants David Feingold and Michael Dazzo, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft, conversion, replevin, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, accounting, and unjust enrichment. Along with Richard Cardinale, defendants served as co-managing members of the Alternative Global Companies. But after their resignation, defendants allegedly “attempt[ed] to convert [certain investments] from the Alternative Global Companies to their own benefit” and refused to surrender corporate books and records that they maintained. Pursuant to Rule 4:11-4(b), plaintiffs served a subpoena ad testificandum on appellant Daniel W. Amaniera, who was not a party to the litigation, seeking only to depose him in New Jersey.

The New York County Commercial Division rules differ materially from rules in New York County generally and, over time, have come to mirror the more stringent federal demands. One such key difference is with respect to expert disclosures, specifically Rule 13(c), which can be a disastrous trap for those unfamiliar with its requirements.

Most practitioners are familiar with CPLR § 3101(d), governing expert disclosure in New York generally, which does not require a written report but only that the expert disclosure—traditionally drafted by counsel—state “in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifications of each expert witness and a summary of the grounds for each expert’s opinion.” In contrast, New York County’s Commercial Rule 13(c) requires that, “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, expert disclosure must be accompanied by a written report, prepared and signed by the witness, if either (1) the witness is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case, or (2) the witness is a party’s employee whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony.” Rule 13(c) also sets forth certain requirements for the content of the report. Specifically, “[t]he report must contain:

(A) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and the reasons for them;

(B) the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinion(s);

(C) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support the opinion(s);

(D) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;

(E) a list of all other cases at which the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition during the previous four years; and

(F) a statement of the compensation to be paid to the witness for the study and testimony in the case.”